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USSR-PRC-VIETNAM TALKING POINTS

Map)

I. Summarized military situation this morning in PDB.

-Larger question is, "How might events unfold?"

II. This much seems clear about players' intentions

A. Vietnam

-Has decided on hardline versus China
-Is sticking to "Indochina Federation" plan - 7

B. Laos has clearly shifted to the Vietnamese side of the quarrelC. Soviets have decided not to openly attack China in the north, at least for now.III. But more things are unclear, so we have to ask what the following collection of evidence means.A. PRC-Vietnam polemics & threat - counterthreat games remain intense

-Notably Chinese threaten another "counterattack" if the Vietnamese continue their "provocations"

B. Vietnam's increased strength in the north, general mobilization and deployment of scratch divisions to Kampuchea

-Related report by Vietnamese that Hanoi is considering initiating small scale incidents. 7

C. Increasing Soviet involvement in Vietnamese military logistics.D. Tremendous Vietnamese economic burden of wars.

IV. All of the above suggests

A. We will see a prolonged bloody war in Kampuchea with

1. Vietnamese trying to make their puppet regime viable

2. Pol Pot forces holding their own or doing better against diluted Vietnamese Army.

3. Chinese aid flowing to Pol Pot's forces through Thai sanctuary, especially island logistics base, while

Map)

S E C R E T

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4. Chinese maneuver to try to find an alternative to Pol Pot,

- perhaps Sihanouk
- not optimistic

B. Laos likely to become a guerrilla battleground again with Chinese military aid going to Meas

C. We see the Vietnamese reluctantly falling into an increasingly dependent relationship on the Soviets

- Soviets demanding more and more concessions
- Vietnamese refusing, but gradually giving ground

Cam Ran Bay
D. Two armies continuing to stare at one another across Sino-Vietnam border

1. Tensions will remain high

2. Chance of renewed hostilities at least on a small scale, involving perhaps hundreds of men on each side

3. Cannot absolutely rule out large scale fighting again involving tens of thousands arising from momentum of events such as

- Heavy Vietnamese artillery barrages laid down on PRC troops in a disputed border area
- PRC counterattacks to neutralize artillery
- Vietnamese respond
- etc. up the scale

E. On the other hand, we can't rule out a shift the other way months from now.

1. China's plan now almost surely is for a steady effort to

- erode Hanoi's position in Kampuchea & Laos
- isolate Vietnam internationally

2. Until it is forced to

- trim its objectives in Indochina
- move away from the Soviets
- accommodate the PRC

3. This may happen, but not likely and certainly not soon.

Cost to PRC of displaced forces - permanent?
not very big